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Abstract
This conceptual paper assesses prevalent critiques of the Common Core State Standards (CCSS) and 
analyzes content from the CCSS in language arts and literacy to determine whether the standards are 
likely to support or undermine key democratic aims of education. The authors conclude that critiques 
of the CCSS have some merit but are generally overstated and misdirected, and the standards give 
inadequate attention to the development of public autonomy but an ideal amount of attention to 
development of private autonomy.
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By October 2013, forty- five states, the District of Columbia, four territories, and the Department of Defense Education Activity had adopted the 
Common Core State Standards (CCSS). Some states, such as 
Indiana, South Carolina, and Oklahoma, however, have since 
backed away from their earlier decisions to adopt the standards. 
Strong resistance to the Common Core continues and is likely to 
intensify as the 2016 U.S. presidential race progresses, as the 
standards have already emerged as one of GOP nominee, Donald 
Trump’s targets. Anticipating a renewed national focus on the 
subject, our primary objectives in this article are to assess the 
merits of prevalent critiques of the Common Core and determine 
whether the standards are likely to support or undermine key 
democratic aims of education.
Consideration of the standards’ likely effect on two key 
components of democratic education— public autonomy (defined, 
for our purposes, as a community’s opportunity and capacity to 
influence public life and shape public policy) and private autonomy 
(defined, for our purposes, as one’s opportunity and capacity to 
think for oneself, to set one’s own goals, and to pursue those goals 
free from excessive outside influence)— provides a framework 
through which to assess prevalent critiques of the standards and 
analyze the standards ourselves. Our analysis shows that while 
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adoption of the standards presents some potential limitations to 
local control over schools (a factor relating to public autonomy), 
many critiques of the Common Core are either overstated or 
misguided and may be mitigated by the standards’ likely 
contribution to overall gains in both public and private autonomy. 
Additionally, we discuss how the standards might be improved to 
better reflect key aims of democratic education.
Our study provides analysis and evaluation of the Common 
Core State Standards for English Language Arts & Literacy in 
History/Social Studies, Science, and Technical Subjects (Common 
Core Standards Initiative, 2013).1 Therefore, when we use the 
labels CCSS, Common Core, or the standards in the analysis that 
follows, we are referring to these literacy standards. Our use of 
the final version of the standards produced by the National 
Governors Association Center for Best Practices and the Council 
of Chief State School Officers rather than a more comprehensive 
review of each state’s slightly modified version of the standards 
may be a limitation of our analysis. However, as we focus on the 
skills and dispositions components of the standards, which are 
consistent from state to state, this limitation is not so severe as to 
undermine the legitimacy of our argument. Additionally, it is 
worth noting that our analysis is of the standards themselves, and 
not the lesson plans, curriculum materials, or assessment and 
accountability measures associated with Common Core, which 
vary from state to state.
We begin with an analysis of critiques of the Common Core 
related to public and private autonomy. We then examine the 
meaning of autonomy and argue that a democratic society has an 
obligation to both develop young citizens’ capacities for autonomy 
and employ democratic procedures for adopting and 
implementing educational standards to accomplish this aim. 
Finally, we assess the Common Core in terms of its likely 
contributions to the enhancement of public and private autonomy 
for all citizens.
Critiques of the Common Core
We have defined public autonomy as a community’s opportunity 
and capacity to influence public life and shape public policy. Most 
critiques of the CCSS focus on potential losses to local control over 
school policy and curricular decisions— conflating adoption and 
implementation processes with the standards themselves— and 
thereby deal only with the opportunity component of public 
autonomy. A second type of criticism, which is less common but 
which we find more compelling, deals with the actual standards as 
they relate to developing students’ capacity for public autonomy. In 
this section, we discuss both types of criticism concerning the 
relation between the standards and public autonomy.
Though criticism of the Common Core comes from 
individuals and groups with varying political perspectives, some of 
the strongest critiques come from leaders and organizations on the 
1 In this article, we do not consider the math standards. We 
recognize their potential contributions to the preparation of students 
for democratic citizenship, but we limited our analysis due to space 
constraints and our own expertise.
political right. Of particular salience to the present discussion, 
many conservative critics claim that adoption of “national 
standards,” which they perceive the Common Core to be, will lead 
to a significant loss of state and local influence and opportunities 
for deliberation over public school policy and curricula (Graebe, 
2013; Kurtz, 2013; McCluskey, Evers, & Stotsky, 2013; Paul, 2013; 
Russo, 2013; Scott, 2013; Smith, 2013;). This development, they have 
argued, would amount to a sacrifice of the interests of students, 
parents, and other members of school communities to those of 
distant special interest groups with influence at the federal 
policymaking level. Such arguments commonly reference the idea 
that the standards are yet another step in a series of efforts to bring 
about a federal monopoly over public education, which would 
inevitably lead to less opportunities for the exercise of public 
autonomy (or at least in relation to local control over public school 
policy and curriculum decisions), less competition, and poorer 
academic performance by American students.2
This type of argument is seen in the findings of an analysis of 
over 10,000 online survey responses to a March 2010 version of 
the CCSS, which found that a “significant number of respondents 
oppose all federal standards, which they perceive the CCSS to be” 
and that some “feel very strongly that any standard not perceived 
as local is problematic. Many of these respondents see this 
initiative as a first step toward a required national curriculum and 
loss of parental freedom.” Similarly, in their analysis of over 14,000 
tweets from the top 150 Twitter subscribers who posted messages 
about the Common Core from February to July of 2013, 
Goldsworthy and Sam (2015) categorized approximately two- 
thirds of those tweets as oppositional toward CCSS. Among the 
most prevalent themes that emerged from their analysis was a 
widespread concern that the standards represented a significant 
threat to the local control component of what we refer to as public 
autonomy, signifying “an annexation of local decision- making, or 
wresting of control from those who should be making decisions 
about local education” (p. 5).
Sentiments such as these, centered on the perception that the 
CCSS are “national standards” that will lead to a loss of autonomy, 
have become so widespread that Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan (2013) delivered a speech to directly address them. Duncan 
sought to push back against misinformation about the standards, 
stating: “The Common Core has become a rallying cry for fringe 
groups that claim it is a scheme for the federal government to usurp 
state and local control of what students learn.” He requested those in 
attendance— primarily newspaper editors— to ask their sources to 
“identify a single lesson plan that the federal government created . . . 
any textbook that the federal government created . . . [or] any 
element, a single word of the Common Core standards that was 
developed or required by the federal government.” Though the 
federal government had no direct role in the creation of the CCSS, 
the belief that the standards represent a federal takeover of public 
education remains widespread.
2 The new Every Student Succeeds Act allows states to adopt Common 
Core but does not require it. In fact, the act requires the federal 
Education Department to remain neutral toward the CCSS.
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A strong voice in libertarian politics, Republican U.S. 
Representative Ron Paul (2013) echoed the above- mentioned fears 
relating to the loss of public autonomy: “We must oppose further 
encroachment on the autonomy of local public schools and work to 
roll- back existing interference” (para. 7). Similarly, Marco Rubio, 
U.S. Senator from Florida and unsuccessful 2016 GOP presidential 
primary candidate, referred to the CCSS as a means for the Obama 
administration “to turn the Department of Education into what is 
effectively a national school board” (Smith, 2013, para. 4). Graebe 
(2013) claimed that the “CCS[S] removes any instructional 
flexibility despite the possibility that their curriculum may not be 
what works best for a particular class” (para. 8). In a similar vein, 
Scott (2013) noted that many see the CCSS as an unproven 
endeavor undermining state autonomy to “direct their own 
educational programs and that set aside the high quality standards 
and assessments some states have created in favor of lower quality 
standards and less academically demanding assessments” (p. 4). 
These politically conservative critics of the Common Core have 
predicted that, by encroaching on the autonomous practices of 
local communities, the “national standards” will limit their ability 
to differentiate curricula based on student needs and particularities 
and will cause the quality of instruction to suffer.
Others criticize the standards based on their limitations of 
classroom readings to mostly informational rather than literary 
texts and general focus on developing transferrable critical 
thinking/reading skills rather than more specific knowledge.3 
Bauerlein and Stotsky (2012) predicted that a heavier focus on 
informational texts will make students less college ready based on 
the belief that problems in college readiness stem from “an 
incoherent, less- challenging [student- centered, multicultural] 
literature curriculum from the 1960s onward” (p. 1). They warned 
that, because the Common Core focuses more on developing skills 
than specific canonical knowledge, widespread adoption of the 
standards presents an opportunity to those who would adopt less 
worthy contemporary texts over great works of English and 
American literature. Berry (2014) and Robbins (2013) sounded the 
alarm about the standards’ potential to be used by the political left 
through mass- marketed, standards- aligned informational texts 
and to promote “a social engineering ideology” as a substitute for 
traditional religious and family values. Thus, these authors held, 
nationwide adoption of standards that place too few requirements 
on schools to adopt literary classics creates a situation that gives 
large publishing houses too much influence over public education 
and opens the door for leftist mischief.
Critiques of the Common Core, however, extend beyond 
those of conservative politicians and scholars. Ravitch (2013) noted 
that the CCSS were “developed by an organization called Achieve 
and the National Governors Association both of which were 
generously funded by the Gates Foundation [and that] there was 
minimal public engagement in the development of the Common 
Core. Their creation was neither grassroots nor did it emanate from 
3 The standards require readings to consist of 70% informational texts 
and 30% literary texts across the high school curriculum, with a 50/50 
split in high school English classes.
the states” (para. 10). From another angle, Au (2013) argued that the 
CCSS will “inevitably lead to restrictive high- stakes, standardized 
testing similar to that associated with No Child Left Behind” (p. 1). 
Thus, Au suggested, high- stakes, standardized testing can play a 
significant role in undermining local influence over what goes on 
in schools by encouraging “teaching to the test.”4
Though we were unable to locate many published scholarly 
critiques of the Common Core guided by explicitly communitarian 
or multiculturalist frameworks, we think such arguments ought to 
be taken up as part of this broader analysis. Particularly, concerns 
about cultural loss for local (and, especially, minority) 
communities should be considered, including the concern that a 
nationwide adoption of a single set of standards (though versions of 
the CCSS do, indeed, vary somewhat from state to state) would 
impose a monolithic vision upon all students and might drown out 
the voices of cultural and religious minorities, people of color, and 
other historically marginalized groups. For instance, in one of the 
few published critiques of this kind, Gangi and Benfer (2014) 
criticized the standards’ list of 171 recommended texts for 
elementary children for only containing 18 works by authors of 
color and few that reflect the lives of children of color and the poor. 
They argued that acquisition of literacy skills and identity 
development requires students to be able to make meaningful 
connections with the people and stories in the texts they read. 
Consequently, the authors suggested, by recommending only a few 
works with which children of color are likely to relate, the standards 
do these students a significant injustice. Furthermore, they 
contended, stocking every classroom with literature that would 
allow children from the dominant, mainstream culture exposure to 
stories about others who look and live differently would likely yield 
social and democratic benefits. Further, some may see the 
standards’ primary focus on college and career readiness to come at 
the cost of the democratic aim of promoting tolerance and respect 
for cultural diversity. These are serious concerns that merit 
additional scholarly attention.
Not everyone is concerned, however, that the CCSS will 
encroach upon state and local autonomy. Some of the research on 
the Common Core has emphasized the fact that the adoption of the 
standards is strictly voluntary and that the federal government 
legally cannot mandate any state to adopt them (StudentsFirst, 
2013). Along these lines, Pearson and Hiebert (2012) noted that the 
“CCSS provide a core set of expectations and intentionally leave 
much to districts, schools, and teachers to figure out for 
themselves— to, if you will, put a local signature on their 
implementation of the core” (p. 3). Scholars at the Aspen Institute 
(2012) similarly claimed that by focusing on the capacities of 
students, “the CCSS does not advocate one particular pedagogical 
approach over another” (p. 1). Further, the Aspen scholars 
emphasized that, in comparison to standards that focus on rote 
learning and content memorization, the Common Core standards 
4 Some scholars may be concerned about losses to teacher autonomy 
(as opposed to autonomy of the local community) due to adoption of the 
CCSS, but these concerns do not fit within our public- private autonomy 
framework and, thus, exceed the scope of this analysis.
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afford local schools stronger autonomy as they implement the 
standards.
The above critiques focus primarily on issues relating to local 
control of school curricula— that is, on issues that only correspond 
to the opportunity component of public autonomy. Critiques of the 
actual content of the standards relating to their suitability for 
developing students’ capacity for public autonomy, however, were 
far less commonplace. In one of the few such critiques, social 
studies scholar Singer (2013a and 2013b) claimed that the Common 
Core standards do not promote the broad aims of a democratic 
education. Singer noted, “In the entire document, there is no real 
discussion of life in a democratic society and the role of education 
in promoting democracy processes and democratic values” (2013b, 
para. 1). And this, to Singer, is problematic, given that the leading 
organization in the social studies, The National Council For the 
Social Studies (NCSS), explicitly has stated that “the goal of 
schooling . . . is not merely preparation for citizenship, but 
citizenship itself; to equip a citizenry with the knowledge, skills, 
and dispositions needed for active and engaged civic life” (National 
Council for the Social Studies, 2010, para. 1). Thus, by not directly 
focusing on issues relating to democratic participation, Singer 
implied that citizens miss out on opportunities to develop 
knowledge, skills, and commitments that enhance public 
autonomy.
We need some way of assessing this collection of claims, and 
the public- private autonomy framework is useful in that regard 
because it addresses fundamental dimensions of the most 
prevalent Common Core critiques and enables us to more 
comprehensively understand the complex nature of autonomy that 
is at stake. Our aim of providing a substantive assessment of the 
above critiques requires that we direct our attention to the 
standards themselves. It also compels us to provide a 
straightforward account of the set of assumptions that grounds our 
argument. Therefore, we will assess these critiques after analyzing 
the standards through our public- private autonomy framework, 
which we explain in greater detail in the following section.
Public and Private Autonomy
Various assumptions about the appropriate role and purposes of 
public education inform our analysis. In addition to preparing 
students for college and career (the stated primary goals of 
Common Core), we believe public schools have a duty to help 
young citizens develop knowledge, skills, and dispositions 
required for active participation in a pluralist, democratic society. 
Toward these efforts, democratic societies are obliged to develop 
capacities for and guarantee opportunities for the exercise of both 
private and public autonomy in their young citizens. Furthermore, 
major curricular decisions, such as the adoption of state standards, 
should be made in a manner that aligns with democratic values. 
These assumptions and the thesis they inform are grounded in 
liberal political theory and a conception of democratic education 
constructed upon the foundational works of Dewey (1916), Rawls 
(1971, 1993/1996, 2005), Gutmann (1987), and Habermas (1995, 
1984) and supported by more recent works of scholars Reich 
(2002), Fletcher (2000), and Creppell (2008).
We consider both private and public autonomy to be central 
components of democratic life and the development of these 
capacities to be important aims of democratic education. Our 
understanding of private and public autonomy derives from an 
intellectual exchange between political philosophers Rawls (1971, 
1993/1996, 2005) and Habermas (1995) over the process of political 
decision making.5 In this debate, Rawls emphasized the 
importance of protecting individual liberty through universal, 
rationally justifiable, constitutional principles (relating to private 
autonomy). Habermas critiqued Rawls’s position, arguing that it 
relied too heavily on abstract justification rather than on the actual 
consent of citizens. In other words, he said that Rawls’s view 
imposed a top- down system of ready- made principles onto 
citizens, foregoing a participatory and deliberative democratic 
process (relating to public autonomy).
The capacities component of public autonomy, however, 
required a critical mass of citizens who were rational, critical 
thinkers with both the skills and the desire to deliberate with 
people from other cultural backgrounds— capacities that Rawls 
seemed to overlook, Habermas seemed to take for granted, and we 
think must be intentionally developed in young citizens. Public 
education, though not the only one, is an important setting 
through which democratic societies might develop young citizens’ 
capacities for public autonomy. Furthermore, a community’s 
capacity for public autonomy is severely undermined when its 
governing bodies fail to provide opportunities for its exercise. 
Thus, the opportunities component of public autonomy requires 
certain preconditions for its realization. There must be some 
significant degree of local control over and opportunities for 
democratic input into policy decisions. Because public autonomy 
requires a critical mass of individuals with the ability to deliberate 
effectively, the state has a responsibility to promote its citizens’ 
development of the knowledge, skills, and dispositions required for 
life in a pluralist, democratic society.
The ability to think and read critically is an essential 
component of both private and public autonomy and, thus, a key 
aim of democratic education. In addition to helping students 
develop as individuals, critical thinking is essential for the healthy 
functioning of a democratic state, lest its citizens fall victim to 
groupthink, mass media manipulation, or the propaganda and 
brainwashing of authoritarian regimes. Significant threats to 
liberal democracies arise when societies fail to foster a critical spirit 
in their future citizens. If students are not encouraged to question 
tradition, cultural norms, and authority, and demand justice and 
equality under the law, democratic societies will be ill- prepared to 
face the challenges they will inevitably encounter. Thus, the 
development of critical thinking skills in young citizens provides 
both individual and social benefits.
Yet, as important as critical thinking is, there are other skills and 
virtues that are also essential components of good citizenship and  
a good education. One manner in which schools can help to develop 
5 Rawls responded to Habermas’s critique (1995) of his work in Lecture 9 
of the Expanded Edition of Political Liberalism, which was published in 
2005.
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future citizens is by educating individuals with the moral qualities 
needed for the functioning of a productive, deliberative democracy. 
Gutmann (1999) said that, “a democracy is deliberative to the extent 
that citizens and their accountable representatives offer one another 
morally defensible reasons for mutually binding laws in an ongoing 
process of mutual justification” (p. xii). She argued that public 
schools play a central role in developing the capacities for this type of 
deliberation in students:
A primary aim of publicly mandated schooling is therefore to cultivate 
the skills and virtues of deliberation . . . Deliberation is not a single 
skill or virtue. It calls upon skills of literacy, numeracy, and critical 
thinking, as well as contextual knowledge, understanding, and 
appreciation of other people’s perspectives. The virtues that 
deliberation encompasses include veracity, nonviolence, practical 
judgment, civic integrity and magnanimity. By cultivating these and 
other deliberative skills and virtues, a democratic society helps secure 
both the basic opportunity of individuals and its collective capacity to 
pursue justice. (pp. xii- xiii)
The teaching of tolerance and respect is also an important 
component of democratic education. Students living in democratic 
societies ought to be made aware of their rights as well as the 
responsibilities that accompany them. One of the responsibilities of 
good citizenship is our obligation to respect the rights of others. 
Students can learn how to respect others’ rights through classroom 
discourse, guided by their teachers, in which each student is 
required to accord all others with respect as persons and to 
recognize what Rawls (1971) called the “burdens of judgment.” The 
burdens of judgment, which are basically factors that illustrate how 
reasonable people can disagree on matters of deep importance, call 
upon citizens of pluralist societies to recognize that none of us has a 
monopoly on truth and to exercise toleration toward one another.
In addition to teaching tolerance, public schools can provide 
meaningful opportunities for democratic deliberation among 
diverse students to cultivate a sense of trust and community in their 
classrooms. Along these lines, it is desirable to foster in future 
citizens a sense of intersubjectivity (Habermas, 1984) or mutuality 
(Creppell, 2008), initiated and sustained by a commitment to 
engage across differences in a shared political project. Mutuality, 
the term we prefer, asks citizens not to set differences aside (which 
is asking quite a lot) but only to commit to maintaining public 
relationships, in which individuals and groups engage in ongoing 
democratic deliberations across meaningful differences. Rather 
than focusing only on our own individual or group rights and 
identities, mutuality requires that we recognize others’ rights and 
identities and seek to engage with others in a public discourse 
through which differences might be negotiated diplomatically. This 
is certainly a tall order for schools, which are already saddled with 
enormous responsibilities (many of which remain presently 
unfulfilled). Nevertheless, the benefits and obligations of 
citizenship are too important to remain underexplored, and as one 
of the greatest purposes of public schooling, democratic education 
ought not to remain marginalized in the curriculum.
Furthermore, because public autonomy requires a critical 
mass of free citizens who have the ability to articulate their 
individual and group interests and assess the competing claims of 
their interlocutors, it seems that public autonomy, to a significant 
degree, requires some number of individual citizens who have the 
capacity for private autonomy. This is not to say that private 
autonomy is not valuable in and of itself but to acknowledge that 
both capacities are core components of our conception of 
democratic education. Private autonomy is a necessary but not 
sufficient component of public autonomy, and, therefore, the two 
must come as a package deal as part of an adequate democratic 
education. Scholars from various theoretical backgrounds, 
however, have conceptualized private autonomy differently, so 
some further clarification of what we mean by the term is in order. 
While the following cursory discussion is far from a comprehensive 
review of the literature on autonomy, we think it will direct readers’ 
attention to a few important concerns relating to the topic and 
provide a clearer picture of the conception of private autonomy we 
reference in our argument.
Fletcher’s (2000) notion of autonomy as authenticity takes into 
account how our “immediate circumstances necessarily shape the 
capacity we have to create and pursue our life- plans” (p. 119). The 
conception of authenticity envisions communities and 
relationships as potential avenues for supporting the development 
of individual autonomy:
When individuals draw on these local resources in ways that expand 
the range and possibility of their choices, increase the potential of their 
choices to meet their needs, and encourage the development of new 
interests and talents, then these relationships and communities support 
a capacity for autonomy that is generally not explained, and in some 
cases not supported, by universalist theories alone. (pp. 119– 120)
This notion of autonomy as authenticity acknowledges the 
importance of recognition (Taylor, 1994) and takes into account 
how identity is formed not in total isolation from others but 
through
both the inward experience of our deliberation over possible choices 
and life- plans, and the outward experience of recognition we feel 
through the understanding and support that others express for our 
choices. These two aspects, one experienced self- reflectively, the other 
in our relations with others, are key aspects of authenticity. (Fletcher, 
2000, p. 120)
This notion of autonomy as authenticity is emancipatory in 
the sense that it draws our attention to pressures for mainstream 
cultural conformity and calls upon educators to avoid practices that 
constrain or silence students’ expression of identities that lie 
outside of the mainstream or at the margins of society. Insights 
from Fletcher’s autonomy as authenticity— including the positive 
role communities play in shaping identity and providing 
opportunities for expression of individual members’ autonomy— 
inform our conception of private autonomy. Underemphasized, 
however, in this conception of autonomy is the tendency of some 
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illiberal cultural groups to stifle individuality or dissent among 
members. Reich’s (2002) conception of minimalist autonomy 
provides additional insights that take a more critical approach to 
the potentially limiting aspects of culture and offers some ideas for 
how schools might respond to such challenges.
Like Fletcher (2000), Reich (2002) acknowledged the 
importance of community and rejects egoistic and hyper- rational 
conceptions of autonomy. He argued that these “strong 
conceptions of autonomy” are “too exacting to encompass the 
forms of life most people actually live or would wish to live” (p. 99), 
and they sever “autonomy from emotion and worldly passions” 
and seem to negate “the possibility of acting autonomously if we 
choose to act out of loyalty or love rather than out of duty to the 
dictates of reason” (pp. 96– 97). He rejects any account of autonomy 
that constructs an ideal of the radical individualist who cuts 
communal ties and group commitments, which most people 
consider critically important aspects of a good life. He instead 
embraced a conception of minimalist autonomy that referred to:
a person’s ability to reflect independently and critically upon basic 
commitments, values, desires, and beliefs, be they chosen or unchosen, 
and to enjoy a range of meaningful life options from which to choose, 
upon which to act, and around which to orient and pursue one’s life 
projects. Minimalist autonomy understood as self- determination 
encompasses both evaluative capacities and a real ability to act on 
one’s evaluations, if necessary adopting new commitments, changing 
one’s values, altering previous desires, or revising old beliefs from a 
spectrum of meaningful possibilities. (p. 105)
Minimalist autonomy, which equates autonomy not with 
relentless rationality and egoistic individualism but with 
sovereignty and self- determination, is concerned less with what 
type of life a person chooses to live and more so with the process 
through which one makes such an important decision. In other 
words, this conception of autonomy is compatible with multiple 
ways of life, including those characterized by deep commitment 
to community, tradition, and/or devout religious belief. Though 
individuals with well- developed capacities for autonomy will 
most likely choose lives that allow them to exercise their 
autonomy, they are nevertheless free to autonomously choose 
lives as members of communities that do not hold autonomy 
among their highest values.
Reich (2002) suggested that, because the capacity for 
autonomy is such an important component of human freedom but 
does not automatically emerge within individuals, the state has an 
obligation to promote its development. Public schools, he 
suggested, offer particularly promising avenues for state- 
sponsored development of autonomy. Thus, the young citizen’s 
right to the type of education that prepares him or her for 
autonomous decision making as an adult requires that the state 
guarantee access for all children— in line with Gutmann’s (1987) 
conception of the democratic threshold and her principle of 
nondiscrimination— to this type of education even when it means 
going against the interests of parents or cultural groups who do not 
place a high value on private autonomy.6 This is not to say that 
parents (or communities) have no rights or legitimate interests in 
the education of children but only that these rights ought to be 
limited insofar as they conflict with the child’s right to an 
autonomy- facilitating education. Warnick’s (2013) limited 
conception of parental rights reflected these sentiments:
 1. Parents have a right to participate in shaping school policies 
that affect their children.
 2. Parents have a right to invite, that is, to expose, their 
children to their own way of life and to persuade them to 
adopt that life as their own.
 3. Parents have a right to engage in practices with their 
children that are essential to exposing the children to their 
own ways of life.
 4. Parents do not have the right to restrict the exposure of 
children to only their own way of life. Children have rights 
to be exposed to multiple perspectives on important issues. 
(p. 51)
Additionally, respect for individual liberty and emancipatory 
insights from Fletcher’s (2000) conception of autonomy as 
authenticity requires restraints on the powers of the state. It must 
be prohibited from imposing what Gutmann (1987) called overly 
determinant or repressive educational conditions upon students. 
For example, the state should not indoctrinate students into 
particular religions or coerce anyone to adopt what Rawls (1971) 
called comprehensive doctrines. Because the conception of private 
autonomy that we have described leaves open the realistic 
possibility of an individual choosing to live in an illiberal 
community, it cannot reasonably be considered a comprehensive 
doctrine. Further, because private autonomy is developed in 
students through a process of exposure to a wide range of 
perspectives, it cannot reasonably be said that students are 
indoctrinated into it as one might be into a comprehensive 
doctrine. Furthermore, mere exposure to an idea or perspective is 
clearly different from indoctrination into it.
In summation, if we value adult members’ autonomous 
choices to live in illiberal groups, and capacities for autonomous 
decision making are not automatically developed, it follows that 
liberal, democratic societies have responsibilities to promote the 
development of citizens’ capacities for autonomy and establish and 
maintain the conditions necessary for them to be able to exercise 
these capacities. Adult citizens, then, can choose to live 
nonautonomous lives but should not be permitted by the state to 
block children’s access to an autonomy- facilitating education. In the 
pages that follow, we analyze the standards and the prevalent 
critiques outlined above through this public- private autonomy lens.
6 Though, unlike us, Gutmann believed the state should be willing to 
grant opt- outs for students whose parents object to their participation in 
school activities that might expose them to ideas that could potentially 
undermine their religious beliefs (e.g., comprehensive sex education, the 
scientific theory of evolution, positive depictions of other religious groups) 
to prevent fundamentalists from withdrawing from public education.
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Assessment of the Standards
In our analysis, we found that the Common Core effectively 
promotes private autonomy but could be improved to increase the 
development of students’ capacities for public autonomy. The CCSS 
lays out a general vision of what it means to be a literate person in 
the 21st century. Particularly, the standards are designed to cultivate 
students who demonstrate a range of characteristics relating to 
critical thinking and autonomous decision making— the basis of 
the conception of private autonomy to which we refer throughout 
this article.
Unlike most state standards that grant peripheral treatment 
to critical thinking, while focusing on content knowledge and 
basic skills, the CCSS set higher benchmarks encouraging students 
to actively participate in processes that require the use of higher 
order thinking. They aim to develop students who habitually 
perform the critical reading and thinking necessary to carefully 
navigate the staggering amount of information available to 
learners in the 21st century. They also direct students to consider 
multiple perspectives, engage in a process of evaluating these 
perspectives according to multiple sources of evidence, and 
examine how biases (including their own) influence this process. 
This type of reading and thinking aligns with the growing body of 
literature calling for disciplinary literacy within the classroom and 
is part of a larger effort to expose students to ideas that broaden 
their perspectives and enrich their lives.
An important, but certainly not the only, characteristic of an 
autonomy- facilitating P– 12 education is that it helps prepare 
students who can function successfully in the environments in 
which they find themselves when they leave school. For many, this 
will mean entering directly into the workforce. For others, this will 
mean matriculating into some form of higher education. The 
Common Core standards, in fact, are designed primarily to 
enhance students’ abilities to find success in these— college and 
career— realms of human experience. Thus, private autonomy and 
critical thinking, certainly beneficial to navigating challenges faced 
in the realms of college and career, are central foci. However, the 
literacy and critical thinking skills and understandings students are 
expected to demonstrate also have wide applicability outside the 
classroom or workplace. To this point, the standards are designed 
to help students become independent people who reflexively 
demonstrate the “cogent reasoning and use of evidence that is 
essential to both private deliberation and responsible citizenship in 
a democratic republic” (CCSSI, 2013).
The CCSS aim to develop students beyond low- level thinkers, 
asking them to critique as well as comprehend. They are intended 
to cultivate students who are “engaged and open- minded— but 
discerning— readers and listeners . . . [who] work diligently to 
understand precisely what an author or speaker is saying, but they 
also question an author’s or speaker’s assumptions and premises 
and assess the veracity of claims and the soundness of reasoning” 
(CCSSI, 2013). Accordingly, these students develop critical 
dispositions and place a high value on the use of evidence in 
argumentation and in informed decision- making. For instance, 
they “cite specific evidence when offering an oral or written 
interpretation of a text. They use relevant evidence when 
supporting their own points in writing and speaking, making their 
reasoning clear to the reader or listener, and they constructively 
evaluate others’ use of evidence” (CCSSI, 2013). The ability to 
evaluate propositions according to evidence provides helpful 
applications to citizenship and to individual pursuits.
Rather than accepting an author’s arguments uncritically, 
students are called upon to evaluate the author’s supporting 
evidence, assess the author’s credibility, and consider the date and 
setting in which the work was written. Specifically, students are 
asked to “trace and evaluate the argument and specific claims in a 
text, distinguishing claims that are supported by reasons and 
evidence from claims that are not” and to “delineate and evaluate 
the argument and specific claims in a text, assessing whether the 
reasoning is sound and the evidence is relevant and sufficient; 
recognize when irrelevant evidence is introduced” (CCSSI, 2013). 
Keenly aware of how an author’s biases can influence his or her 
writing, CCSS encourage students to assess how point of view and 
purpose shape the content and style of a text. For instance, students 
are required to cite strong and thorough textual evidence to 
support their analysis of an author’s writing as well as inferences 
drawn from a text. Students are called upon to compare and 
contrast multiple authors’ perspectives or interpretations of 
particular ideas or events and “integrate information from diverse 
sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent 
understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among 
sources” (CCSSI, 2013).
When such analysis leads to confusion or conflicting points of 
view on an issue, students are asked to “identify where the texts 
disagree on matters of fact or interpretation,” determine an author’s 
point of view or purpose in a text, and “analyze how the author 
acknowledges and responds to conflicting evidence or viewpoints” 
(CCSSI, 2013). Again, cultivating in students a desire to seek out 
and examine multiple perspectives as part of the process of forming 
their own views on a particular issue is of immense value to 
autonomy development and enhances the quality (and hopefully, 
the outcomes) of democratic deliberation.
Though explicit references to democratic education are 
limited within the standards, this is not to say that the standards fail 
to emphasize the development of individuals and groups capable of 
participating in the public sphere as rational, deliberative citizens— 
the very essence of public autonomy. Specifically, the standards 
direct students to consider multiple perspectives, engage in a 
process of evaluating these perspectives according to multiple 
sources of evidence, and examine how biases (including their own) 
influence this process— skills and dispositions that are central to 
deliberative democracy. Further, the standards consistently 
encourage various forms of discourse among diverse partners in 
the classroom. In this sense, students are expected to participate in 
a dialogue that is representative of ideal political discourse among 
adult citizens in a productive pluralist democracy. Such an aim— 
though only one example of how the standards mirror many of the 
aims of a democratic education— provides students with the 
opportunity to develop into citizens who recognize value in the 
voices of their peers and understand appropriate means for 
engaging in a deliberative community. Nevertheless, the standards’ 
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explicit focus is on preparing students for college and career, not 
necessarily citizenship. The standards do not, in our view, give 
adequate attention to developing the knowledge, skills, and 
dispositions relating to students’ capacities for public autonomy.
Assessment of the Critiques
As we have already discussed, rhetoric in opposition to the 
Common Core includes critiques from a range of perspectives, 
with some arguments warning that adoption of “national 
standards” will lead to a significant loss of state and local influence 
over curriculum and, thus, sacrifice the interests of students, 
parents, and other members of school communities to those of 
distant special interest groups with influence at the federal 
policymaking level. These arguments typically stem from concern 
that CCSS will eventually lead to a centralized, federal government 
monopoly over public education, which critics contend will 
inevitably lead to less competition and poorer academic 
performance by American students as well as potential loss of voice 
for already marginalized groups. Though exaggerated, these claims 
likely reflect the concerns of a significant portion of the American 
population, and they deserve to be taken seriously by scholars, 
policymakers, and curriculum developers.
While we remain unconvinced that state adoption of 
Common Core will serve as a Trojan horse, leading to an inevitable 
takeover of public education by the federal government, concerns 
over the increasing centralization of public school decision making 
have some legitimacy. Arguments relating to the loss of local 
control, a very limited component of public autonomy, are also 
probably overstated, but, again, there is likely at least a kernel of 
truth behind them. That is, full implementation of any form of 
nationally benchmarked standards (even if they vary to a degree 
from state to state) would inevitably drown out a significant 
portion of local influence over what to teach in the public schools 
and how to teach it. Yet, as we have seen at various points in the 
history of the United States, when human rights are at odds with 
local decision making, it is often appropriate for local decision 
making to give way. If one believes that every child has the right to 
an autonomy- facilitating education, as we do, and observes 
inequities from one community to another in regard to children’s 
access to this type of education, then it follows that some limited 
centralization of educational policymaking is appropriate.
Any loss to various aspects of public autonomy (e.g., local 
control or opportunities for public input into policy decisions) 
arising from adoption or implementation of CCSS could be 
mitigated by greater gains in private autonomy and other 
knowledge, skills, and dispositions relating to the capacity for 
public autonomy. This is not to say, however, that local values and 
voices should be ignored. In fact, the standards’ design leaves much 
room for local influence into which content sources are selected for 
use in the classroom. Thus, only certain components of local 
control will be undermined and only minimal aspects of local 
cultures will be marginalized— those illiberal aspects that would 
undermine the development of students’ autonomy— and this 
would be something to celebrate rather than dread. Further, if 
private autonomy is a necessary but not sufficient component of 
public autonomy, as we have argued, then liberal democratic 
societies might even value some loss of other aspects of public 
autonomy in education if it led to more private autonomy for 
students and thus contributed to more public autonomy in areas 
outside of education. Given the fact that much space remains for 
local communities to shape what goes on in their schools, it is 
conceivable that conversations about educational policy and 
curriculum might actually improve as their capacities for public 
autonomy improve in the long run.
Critics of the Common Core often conflate implementation 
efforts with the standards themselves. While due consideration of 
standards implementation is of crucial importance for sound 
educational policymaking, this conflation is ultimately 
unproductive. Au’s (2013) concerns, for instance, that the standards 
will require adoption of autonomy- inhibiting standardized tests 
does not implicate the actual content of the standards but rather 
the practice of high- stakes testing, which is a different matter 
altogether.7 Equally misguided are critics who point to, as evidence 
of the problematic nature of the Common Core, faulty activities, 
texts, or lesson plans created by companies more concerned with 
politics or profits than educational outcomes or teachers struggling 
to implement the standards. The process of resource selection and 
curriculum development should be guided by teachers’ 
professional expertise and subjected to appropriate democratic 
constraints— that is, if excessively political texts and highly 
problematic supplemental materials are selected for use in the 
classroom, parents and communities should have meaningful 
opportunities to challenge these decisions and their concerns 
ought to be taken seriously. Poorly constructed implementation 
efforts do not reflect upon the quality or content of the standards 
themselves. If Common Core critics wish to enhance the credibility 
of their arguments, they should either explicitly state that they are 
addressing implementation efforts or actually address the 
standards in their analyses, which would require that they modify 
those aspects of their arguments that are unsupported by or 
directly in conflict with available evidence.
Furthermore, the CCSS do nothing to prevent any state from 
developing its own unique policies of education. Not only can 
states independently determine how the CCSS should be 
implemented, they are also free to make changes to existing 
standards. New York serves as an example of a state that has made 
significant changes and additions to CCSS, whereas Kansas chose 
to simply change the name (Porter, McMaken, Hwang, & Yang, 
2011). The CCSS do in some sense restrict individual states and 
districts but only from educating in such a way as to hinder 
students’ consideration of a range of reasonable perspectives— 
strongly suggesting adherence to Gutmann’s (1999) principle of 
nonrepression (p. 46). Similarly, states that adopt CCSS are 
required to ensure that all schools are afforded the resources 
necessary to provide students meaningful opportunities to acquire 
the skills they will need to participate in the democratic process 
7 The new Every Child Succeeds Act is an attempt to address these 
important— albeit separate— issues.
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(again, relating to Gutmann’s conception of a democratic threshold 
and principle of nondiscrimination).
The conservative critiques of Common Core do not focus on 
the capacities component but only the opportunity component of 
public autonomy. That is, they give little indication that critics are 
concerned about how or whether young citizens will develop 
necessary capacities for public autonomy. Thus, their critiques rest 
on the claim that local communities are losing some degree of 
control over the public schools. This is true, but only in a very 
limited sense. If the Common Core really does have the power to 
influence political control over school policy, the only foreseeable 
cultural losses for conservatives (or other groups) would be those 
aspects of their culture that run against the development of 
children’s autonomy— which, we believe, would represent 
constructive developments.
Similarly, most components of the multiculturalist argument 
also exaggerate the threats of the Common Core to public 
autonomy. If teachers can select much of the content based on their 
own professional expertise and the needs and interests of their 
students, which the standards clearly allow, it is unlikely that the 
CCSS would resemble anything akin to neoconservative cultural 
imperialism. Furthermore, as far as content is concerned, existing 
state standards (especially in the more ideologically conservative 
states) seem no less likely than so- called national standards to 
silence or marginalize minority perspectives. In fact, because they 
focus on critical thinking skills rather than canonical content, the 
Common Core standards are less likely than many states’ standards 
to marginalize minority perspectives. Ultimately, these criticisms 
of the Common Core reflect only a superficial understanding of 
autonomy— that is, they generally only consider potential threats to 
local control or opportunities for public deliberation over policy 
rather than a more comprehensive view that considers both the 
opportunity and capacity components of public autonomy.
However, there are some aspects of the standards that might 
be revised to address the most compelling component, in our view, 
of the multiculturalist argument: the concern that the Common 
Core ELA standards’ list of recommended texts does an inadequate 
job of representing non- mainstream voices. Fletcher’s (2000) 
insights about the positive role of community and culture in the 
formation of identity are particularly salient in this regard— for, if a 
liberal, democratic society is to justly and effectively respond to the 
challenges of multiculturalism and religious pluralism, it must 
make serious efforts to include a wide range of minority 
perspectives on the public school curriculum. Such an inclusive list 
of texts would likely yield benefits to the development of autonomy 
in students from cultural minority groups who would be more 
likely to see positive aspects of their communities reflected in the 
curriculum as well as students from mainstream groups who would 
be exposed to a wider range of possibilities. Likewise, if Fletcher’s 
insights were better reflected in the standards themselves— that is, 
if the standards contained explicit references to the importance of 
community, culture, and religion/worldview in the individual’s life, 
students’ autonomy interests would likely be furthered and forces 
contributing to cultural loss blunted.
We also agree with Singer’s (2013) contention that the 
standards should have a stronger, or rather a more explicit, focus on 
democratic citizenship. The CCSS are problematic in this respect 
because, although they are well- designed to develop students’ 
critical thinking skills and help them become individually 
empowered, they give inadequate attention to other components of 
democratic education such as the development of their capacities 
for deliberation and the disposition of mutuality. While the 
standards call upon students to listen to and assess other people’s 
points of view, certainly both dialogue and discourse require more 
than carefully listening to another person or assessing the veracity 
of their claims. This shortcoming represents a major problem to 
those concerned about the development of students’ capacities for 
public autonomy, and we would like to see revisions of the 
standards that give more attention to these important components 
of democratic education.
Conclusion
The driving purpose of the Common Core State Standards is to 
“insure that all students are college and career ready” (CCSSI, 
2012). While the skills needed for success in college and career in a 
21st century, interconnected world transfer easily to the arena of 
democratic citizenship, greater emphasis on the latter would 
certainly communicate an important message to young people. 
These potential shortcomings of the Common Core could be easily 
addressed without undermining the key aims of existing standards. 
By placing a greater emphasis on democratic citizenship, losses to 
local control over public school standards would be mitigated by 
overall gains in public autonomy relating to students’ enhanced 
ability and motivation for democratic participation. Thus, adding 
the third component of citizenship to the college and career foci of 
the Common Core would greatly improve the standards, better 
promote students’ development of capacities for public autonomy, 
and likely yield innumerable benefits for both individuals and 
society.
References
Au, W. (2013). Coring social studies within corporate education reform: The Common 
Core State Standards, social justice, and the politics of knowledge in U.S. schools. 
Critical Education 4(5), 1- 16.
Bauerlein, M. & Stotsky, S. (2012). Common Core’s ELA Standards place college readiness 
at risk. (Pioneer Institute white paper.no. 89). Boston, MA: Pioneer Institute.
Berry, S. (2014, May 22) Teacher: White ‘privilege’ makes Common Core necessary. 
Breitbart.. Retrieved from http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2014/05/22/
teacher-common-core-necessary-because-as-a-white-male-i-ve-been-given-a-lot 
-of-privilege-i-didn-t-earn
Common Core State Standards Initiative. (2010). Reactions to the March 2010 draft 
Common Core State Standards: Highlights and themes from the public feedback. 
Last accessed June 1, 2016. Retrieved from http://www.corestandards.org/
assets/k-12-feedback-summary.pdf
Common Core State Standards Initiative. (2012). Mission statement. Retrieved from 
http://www.corestandards.org
Common Core State Standards Initiative. (2013). English Language Arts Standards. 
Retrieved from http://www.corestandards.org/ELA-Literacy
democracy & education, vol 24, no- 2  feature article 10
Creppell, I. (2012). Toleration, politics, and the role of mutuality. In M. S. Williams & 
 J. Waldron (Eds.), Toleration and its limits (pp. 315- 359). New York: New York 
University Press.
Dewey, J. (1985). Democracy and education 1916. J. A. Boydston, & P. Baysinger (Eds.). 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Fletcher, S. (2000). Education and emancipation. New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press.
Galston, W. (1995). Two concepts of liberalism. Ethics 61(3), 523.
Gangi, J. & N. Benfer (2014). How Common Core’s recommended books fail children of 
color. In V. Strauss, How Common Core’s recommended books fail children of 
color. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/
wp/2014/09/16/how-common-cores-recommended-books-fail-children-of-color/
Goldsworthy, H., & Sam, C. (2015). Twitter and the Common Core: Understanding 
emerging narratives through discourse. Unpublished paper presented in session:
Common Core Implementation and Politics, Division L, Educational Policies and 
Politics, Section 3: Curriculum and Instructional Practice, at the 2015 Annual 
Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, Illinois.
Graebe, H. (2013, June 3) Common Core: Bad for teachers and students. RedState.com. 
Retrieved from http://www.redstate.com/freedomworks/2013/06/03/common 
-core-bad-for-teachers-and-students/
Gutmann, A. (1987). Democratic education. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Gutmann, A. (1999). Democratic education (Revised edition). Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action (vol. I) (T. McCarthy, Trans.). 
Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Habermas, J. (1995). Reconciliation through the public use of reason: Remarks on John 
Rawls’s political liberalism. The Journal of Philosophy, 92(3) 109– 131.
Kurtz, S. (2013, May 31). Tea Party revives to fight Common Core. National Review Online. 
Retrieved from http://m.nationalreview.com/corner/349808/tea-party-revives 
-fight-common-core-stanley-kurtz
McCluskey, N., Evers, W., & Stotsky, S. (2013). Stop the rush to the Common Core. NY 
Daily News. Retrieved from http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/stop-rush 
-common-core- article-1.1385630
National Council for the Social Studies. (2010). Revitalizing civic learning in our schools. 
Retrieved from http://www.socialstudies.org/positions/revitalizing_civic_learning
Paul, R. (2013). “Common Core” nationalizes and dumbs down public school curriculum. 
The Free Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.the-free-foundation.org/
tst5-27- 2013.html
Pearson, P. D., & Hiebert, E. H. (2012). Understanding the common core state standards. 
Teaching with the Common Core Standards for English Language Arts, Grades 3– 5, 1.
Porter, A., McMaken, J., Hwang, J., & Yang, R. (2011). Common core standards the new 
US intended curriculum. Educational Researcher, 40(3), 103– 116.
Ravitch, D. (2013). Why I cannot support the common core standards. Diane Ravitch’s 
blog. Retrieved from http://dianeravitch.net/2013/02/26/why-i-cannot-support 
-the-common-core-standards/
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Rawls, J. (1996). Political liberalism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Rawls, J. (2005). Political liberalism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. (Original 
work published 1993)
Reich, R. (2002). Bridging liberalism and multiculturalism in American education. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Robbins, J. (2013). Uncommonly bad. Academic Questions 26(1). Retrieved from https://
www.nas.org/articles/the_common_core_state_standards_two_views.
Russo, A. (2013). Common what?: What is Common Core and why is everyone— right, 
left— so mad about it? Slate.com. Retrieved from http://www.slate.com/articles/
double_x/doublex/2013/09/common_core_either_you_re_against_this_new 
_push_for_academic_standards_and.single.html
Scott, R. (2013). A republic of republics: How common core undermines state and local 
autonomy over K- 12 education. (Pioneer Institute white paper no. 102.) Boston, 
MA: Pioneer Institute.
Singer, A. (2013a, July 30). What’s missing from Common Core is education for 
democracy. Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
alan-trisinger/whats-missing-from-common_b_3673244.html
Singer, A. (2013b, August 30). What does a Common Core/Danielson lesson plan look 
like? Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-singer/
what-does-a-common-coreda_b_3804493.html
Smith, A. C. (2013, July 27). Florida GOP feels conservative backlash over Common 
Core. Tampa Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.tampabay.com/news/
politics/stateroundup/florida-gop-feels-conservative-backlash-over-common 
-core/2133569
StudentsFirst.org (2013). Common Core State Standards: Establishing rigor for all 
students. StudentsFirst Policy Publication. Sacramento, CA: StudentsFirst.org. 
Retrieved from http://edref.3cdn.net/bdc3e16de9f639f2ec_2um6vbfh7.pdf
Taylor, C. (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
The Aspen Institute (2012). Pedagogy and the CCSS. Retrieved from http://colegacy.org/
news/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Pedagogy-and-the-CCSS.pdf
Warnick, B (2013). Understanding student rights in schools: Speech, religion, and privacy in 
educational settings. New York, NY: Teachers College Press, Columbia University.
